cases
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Martelly v. Belgrave, 2024 ONSC 2746
[1] The matter proceeded before me as an uncontested trial. The Applicant commenced an Application on April 21, 2023. In the Application he claimed the following relief:
1. An Order for the Applicant, Rionne Denroy Martelly, to have interim and final exclusive possession of the home municipally known as 634 Thompson Road South, Milton, ON and its contents.
2. An Order that the Applicant, Rionne Denroy Martelly, shall be entitled to retain possession of the property municipally known as 634Thompson Road South, Milton, ON forthwith.
3. An Order that the Respondent, Odetta Belgrave, shall vacate the property municipally known as 634 Thompson Road South, Milton, ON forthwith;
4. An Order that the Applicant, Rionne Denroy Martelly, shall be entitled to retain the property municipally known as 634 Thompson RoadSouth, Milton, ON free from any claim by the Respondent, Odetta Belgrave, and that the said Applicant shall be free to deal with or dispose of the said property as they deem fit.
5. An Order for an accounting of all property in which the Respondent, Odetta Belgrave, held an interest at the date of cohabitation and at the date of separation, whether in her sole name, joint names with another person, or registered in the name of another but being held in trust for the said Respondent pursuant to sections 7 and 9 of the Family Law Act and section 122 of the Courts of Justice Act.
6. An Order restraining the Respondent, Odetta Belgrave, from transferring, assigning, pledging, disposing of, depleting or otherwise dealing with her assets pending a final determination of the issues in the withing proceeding, pursuant to sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act.
7. An Order restraining the Respondent, Odetta Belgrave, from transferring, disposing of or in any way dealing with any lines of credit, bank accounts or any monies on deposit for her or under her control or the control of any company in which she has an interest without the consent of the Applicant, Rionne Denroy Martelly, and that she preserve all such lines of credit, bank accounts and monies on deposit until further order of this Court.
8. An Order that any claims by the Respondent, Odetta Belgrave, related to, inter alia, division of property; monetary or proprietary remedies for unjust enrichment including claims where there is a joint family venture, claims in trust, including any claims to a constructive or resulting trust; and an equalization payment shall be dismissed.
[2] The Application was personally served on May 15, 2023. The Respondent has not filed an Answer and has not responded to the proceeding.
[…]
[25] On the basis of section 96(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the tort of trespass, a writ of possession shall issue. The Applicant is the owner of the Property. He wishes to return to his Property.
[…]
Conclusion/Costs
[29] In conclusion, I grant the following order:
1. A Writ of Possession shall issue regarding the property at 634 Thompson Road South, Milton, Ontario in favour of the Applicant, as against the Respondent, to take effect August 29, 2024. The Respondent shall vacate the Property on or before this date.
2. The Applicant shall have exclusive possession of the Property commencing August 30, 2024.
3. The Respondent’s contributions to the carrying costs of the Property shall cease effective August 29, 2024.
4. When the Respondent vacates the Property she shall be allowed to take only her personal effects.
5. A copy of the order issued and entered pursuant to these Reasons shall forthwith be served upon the Respondent, together with a copy of these Reasons.
6. If the Applicant is claiming costs, he shall submit brief written submissions as to costs (2 pages, double spaced), together with a bill of costs, within 15 days of today.
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2024/2024onsc2746/2024onsc2746.html
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V.R. v. E.R., 2023 ONCJ 486
“SULLIVAN, J
[1] This is a decision from a 3-day trial held on August 23, 2023, to August 25, 2023.
[147] Ms. V.R. shall have decision-making authority for the children S.R. age 17 born September 2006, M.R. age 15 born December 2007, S.R. age 7 born December 2015 regarding matter of their health, education and general welfare.
[148] The primary residence of the children named above shall be with the Applicant Ms. V.R.
[159] Mr. E.R. shall pay to Ms. V.R. child support on the 1st of each month commencing September 1, 2023, in the amount of $1,507.00 per month for the 3 children S.R. age 17 born September 2006, M.R. age 15 born December 2007, and child S.R. age 7 born December 2015 based on his annual income for 2022 which is $75,883.00.
COSTS:
[166] By November 15, 2023, Ms. V.R. if she is seeking cost shall serve and file via a 14-b motion to my attention, 3-page max submission on costs along with a bill of costs and signed offer to settle.
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2023/2023oncj486/2023oncj486.html
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Garibello v. Garzon, 2023 ONSC 5698
[2] The sole issues directed to trial by Justice Nakonechny are the validity of the CA, and if not valid, the Applicant’s constructive trust claim over the family property, and the Respondent’s trust claim over a condo unit that parties purchased in the Applicant’s name at 6456 Confederation Avenue in Mississauga.
[3] I find that the Applicant was not under duress or undue influence when she signed the CA. The agreement as it pertains to property rights is not unconscionable. The parties did not repudiate the property provisions of the CA through their conduct. The Applicant understood that property should be divided according to legal ownership and now benefits from that agreement having a condo solely in her name.
[23] The Applicant argued that the Respondent misrepresented the nature of the CA. There was no misrepresentation relating to property rights. Most of her arguments relate to spousal support – an issue that is not the subject of this trial.
Conclusion:
[24] For these reasons, I dismiss the Applicant’s claims in this trial. The property rights sections of the CA are valid and binding. Neither party has a claim to the other’s property and all property shall be divided according to legal title at the date of separation.
[25] The Respondent was successful and is entitled to costs. The parties should resolve costs. If after meaningful attempts, they cannot, Mr. Toor can deliver an updated Bill of Costs and costs submissions no longer that five pages, double spaced with no more than three cases.
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Singh v. Seth, 2022 ONCA 837
[1] The appellant appeals the decision of the motion judge striking his family law claim on the basis that the motion judge committed a number of legal and procedural errors as follows: 1) the appellant was denied procedural fairness when the motion judge denied him an opportunity to cross-examine the respondent on her affidavit; 2) the motion judge failed to properly evaluate the facts pertaining to the appellant’s disclosure; 3) the motion judge failed to allow the appellant to pay his outstanding costs order out of a pool of mutually held funds; and 4) the motion judge erred in effectively granting the respondent an equitable remedy when she came to court with unclean hands.
[2] We would not give effect to any of the appellant’s grounds of appeal. As such, the appeal is dismissed.
Conclusion
[8] In all the circumstances the appeal is dismissed with costs payable to the respondent in the amount of $4,800 all-inclusive.
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Bandyopadhyay v. Chakraborty, 2021 ONSC 7706
“[1] This costs endorsement relates to a family law trial that was conducted over 16 non-consecutive days between January 30, 2020 and March 23, 2021. I issued Reasons for Judgment on September 7, 2021: Bandyopadhyay v. Chakraborty, 2021 ONSC 5943. I have received and reviewed written costs submissions from the parties.
ORDERS
[97] I therefore make the following orders:
1. Ms. Chakraborty is required to pay $173,601.90[2] in costs, all inclusive. This payment shall be made forthwith from the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.
2. The $487,143.61 net proceeds of sale, currently held in trust, shall immediately be disbursed as follows:
(a) An amount of $173,601.90 shall be released to Mr. Toor, in trust for Mr. Bandyopadhyay, to satisfy the above costs order.
(b) An amount of $28,500, belonging to Ms. Chakraborty, shall continue to be held in trust until such time as she formally discontinues her legal action in India pertaining to the Kolkata flat.
(c) An amount of $38,969.91 shall be released directly to Ms. Chakraborty (this amount takes into account the $5,000 advance that she already received).
(d) The remaining amount of $246,071.80 shall be released directly to Mr. Bandyopadhyay.
3. The $151,560 net proceeds from the assignment of the Rathburn condominium, also being held in trust, shall immediately be divided equally and 50% released directly to each of the parties.
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Bandyopadhyay v. Chakraborty, 2021 ONSC 5943
The trial of this divorce proceeding commenced on January 30, 2020 and concluded on March 23, 2021. Amendments to the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) were enacted and came into force during the trial, on March 1, 2021. Pursuant to s. 35.3 of the Divorce Act, I have decided the parenting issues in this case in accordance with the current legislative framework, but I adopt the former terminology of “custody” and “access” (which is no longer used in the statute) when referring to interim orders made in this case before March 1, 2021 and to other cases decided under the previous statutory regime.
The Trial
“[38] The trial took a complicated procedural path, with evidence called out of the usual order and some evidence adduced by way of affidavit (subject to cross-examination) because of two mid-trial motions. It was originally scheduled for 5 days when it commenced in late January 2020. It was not concluded until March 23, 2021, after 15 days of hearing spread out over 14 months. There were multiple adjournments, mostly due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[39] The trial should not have taken as long as it did. Some of the delay is attributable to Mr. Bandyopadhyay’s tendency to give answers that were unresponsive to the questions asked, both in chief and during his cross examination. I am not suggesting that he was evasive; it was just his manner of speaking. However, I had to caution him repeatedly to listen carefully to the questions and to focus his answers. His tangents prolonged his testimony.
[40] Ms. Chakraborty also contributed to the delay with frequent late appearances in court by her and her counsel. By far the primary cause of delay that unnecessarily prolonged the trial was the disruptive behavior of Ms. Chakraborty’s first counsel, Mr. Isaac. He repeatedly interrupted the proceedings, disregarded the rules of evidence, raised issues and objections that patently had no merit and frequently re-argued issues that had already been decided. I cautioned him repeatedly and warned him that his conduct could have cost consequences for his client. Ms. Chakraborty eventually terminated Mr. Isaac’s retainer (in or about February 2021) and retained Mr. Rashdi to represent her for the duration of the trial, which proceeded relatively smoothly. “
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Reshetnikova v. Rawlins et al, 2020 ONSC 7988
“[1] On November 18, 2020, the applicant, (“the wife”). brought a motion, without notice to the respondents, (“the husband”) and (“the husband’s mother”), for temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, title to which is registered in the husband’s sole name. The wife named the husband and the husband’s mother as co-respondents in her Application.”
Summary of Positions and Issue before the Court
“[5] The husband is the registered owner of the matrimonial home. On March 30, 2020, he was removed from the home as a result of a criminal charge and the terms of his Recognizance prevent him from having any direct or indirect contact with the wife. The wife has the same rights of possession of the matrimonial home as the husband has by virtue of s.19 of the Family Law Act. The wife’s position on the motion is that after the husband was removed from the matrimonial home, the husband’s mother created an environment that made it toxic and untenable for her and the children to continue to reside with her in the matrimonial home. The husband’s mother seeks possessory rights to the matrimonial home.
[6] In this motion, the husband’s mother is effectively taking the position that the wife is not entitled to an order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home because the effect of that order is to deprive the husband’s mother of her alleged right to possession of the house.”
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Zaldin v. Chandra, 2020 ONSC 5140
“[1] Mr. Zaldin brings a motion seeking a court order striking out Mr. Chandra’s November 19, 2019 affidavit and another seeking to vacate two orders of assessment against him dated May 8, 2013 and January 25, 2019. He submits that the court should grant the remedies he seeks because Mr. Chandra has effectively sabotaged his right to cross-examine him on his affidavit and because of the unwarranted delay in the setting of a date for the assessment.
CONCLUSION
[40] For the above reasons, Mr. Zaldin’s motion is dismissed.
ORDERS
[43] Based on these factors, I award costs in favour of Mr. Chandra in the amount of $5,000 inclusive. Mr. Zaldin must pay the amount within ninety (90) days of today’s date.”
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Verma v. Bhooi, 2019 ONSC 6251
[1] In this case where the date the parties separated is a central issue, there is no dispute the parties have spent far more time apart than they have together during the marriage.
[2] The applicant Ms. Verma commenced this application on August 17, 2015 when she finally accepted the fact that she and her husband, the respondent Mr. Bhooi, were living separate apart with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. Ms. Verma seeks relief in the nature of a divorce, spousal support, and an equalization payment and other orders, among other things. The date of separation is relevant to the determination of the issues relating to spousal support and equalization, with Mr. Bhooi favouring an earlier date.
[3] After numerous appearances before various judges for case conferences and on motions, Shaw J. ordered a focused hearing under Family Law Rule 1(7.2). The purpose of the focused hearing is for the court to make factual findings that will be pivotal to the determination of larger issues. On consent, Shaw J. defined the following questions for the court to answer:
1. The date of separation;
2. The income of both the applicant and the respondent; and
3. Whether the respondent has been financially supporting the applicant.
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Ganesh v. Kumaresan, 2018 ONSC 5793
“The Issue
[1] Over two dates, I dealt with motions brought by both parties for productions and undertakings from the other. I reserved my decision for written reasons to follow. Both parties were ordered to produce. Both parties were unsuccessful in some of their requests. At the end of my reasons on September 14, 2018, I said:
Given that both sides were required to produce, I advised counsel that I would not order costs. I did not invite any submissions. That was at the end of a long day. On further thought, it occurs to me that there may be factors that I am unaware of that could affect costs. If either party wishes to make submissions, they shall be made within 15 days. If submissions are made, responding submissions shall be made within 15 days thereafter. There shall be no reply submissions unless requested by me.
[2] I have now received those submissions. Both sides say that they were more reasonable and successful than the other. Both sides seek costs from the other.
Authorities
[3] The Family Law Rules provide the following with respect to an award of costs:
24. (1) There is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion, enforcement, case or appeal.
(11) A person setting the amount of costs shall consider,
(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case;
(c) the lawyer’s rates;
(d) the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witnesses, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of the order;
(e) expenses properly paid or payable; and
(f) any other relevant matter.
[4]Costs rules are designed to foster three fundamental purposes:
(a) to partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation;
(b) to encourage settlement; and
(c) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants.
[5] Costs awards, at the end of the day, should reflect “what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful parties.”
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Zaldin v. Chandra, 2017 ONSC 7143
“[1] The solicitor in this matter, Mr. Zaldin was retained by Mr. Chandra in connection with a family law case. Mr. Chandra took issue with Mr. Zaldin’s accounts and obtained an Order for Assessment from the Registrar on May 8, 2013. The Assessment Order relates to 17 accounts issued by Mr. Zaldin in 2012, totaling approximately $140,000 (including both fees and disbursements).
[6] n the Motion before me, Mr. Zaldin asks the Court to set aside the May 8, 2013 Assessment Order and dismiss all of Mr. Chandra’s claims in the assessment proceeding based on Rule 60.12(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[43] In my view, Mr. Chandra has largely prevailed on the motion, despite the fact that I found he breached one element of Justice Donohue’s Interlocutory Order. I conclude that Mr. Chandra is entitled to an order for costs.”
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Halton Children’s Aid Society v. M.M., 2017 ONCJ 569
“[1] The Halton Children’s Aid Society (“the Society” or “HCAS”) brings a protection application regarding three children (collectively “the children”):
• AB, born […], 2009 (“AB”).
• AM, born […], 2010 (“AM”), and
• MM, born […], 2013 (“MM”).
CONCLUSION
[278] For the reasons set out above, I find that the children are:
• AB, born […], 2009,
• AM, born […], 2010, and
• MM, born […], 2013.
[281] I find that AB is in need of protection pursuant to CFSA s.37 (2) (d).
[282] I find that AM and MM are in need of protection pursuant to CFSA s.37 (2) (d) and (i).
[285] AM and MM shall be placed in the care of the aunt and uncle, subject to the supervision of the Society for a period of 12 months. The following terms of supervision will apply:
1) The aunt and uncle shall continue to work cooperatively with the Society;
2) The aunt and uncle shall allow the Society to conduct visits to their home and to meet privately with AM and MM in their home, at school, or elsewhere as required;
3) The aunt and uncle shall notify the Society of any changes in family constellation and contact information at least seven days before such change, and where advance notice is not possible, within 24 hours of such change;
4) The aunt and uncle shall sign reasonable consents for disclosure of information to/by the Society pertaining to themselves and AM and MM as required;
5) The aunt and uncle shall access reasonable programs and services recommended for them by the Society and any collaterals involved with the family, including any counsellors, mental health professionals, and AM and MM ’s school.
6) If recommended by the Society, the aunt and uncle shall, with the assistance of the Society, locate any therapist or counsellor needed by AM and MM.
7) The aunt and uncle shall abstain from using illegal substances while in a caregiving role to AB, except in accordance with a valid medical prescription. In any event, their judgment shall not be impaired by any such drug while in a caregiving role with AB.
[286] The children shall have access to each other, to JB and to their maternal grandparents, GB and SB. The access shall occur for one night, overnight on alternate weekends on dates and times as agreed between JC, the aunt and uncle, JB, and the maternal grandparents. During their access, the grandparents and JB shall not allow any telephone contact by the children to MM.
Closing Note
[289] This has been a very long and difficult trial. I would like to gratefully thank counsel for their civility, good humor and fine work. I particularly thank them for their excellent and useful final submissions.”
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Kelada v Labib, 2016 ONSC 7737
“[1] This is a motion brought by the father for permission to travel with his nine year old son to Egypt for a two week period during the December 2016 to January 2017 school break. The mother does not consent to the travel for several reasons.
[36] Based on the conclusion reached above, I must dismiss the father’s motion. I note, however, that the motion is decided on the evidence as it exists today. Should the risk factors relevant to my analysis ameliorate in future, such a trip may eventually be possible for Christian.
[37] It is unfortunate that Christian will not meet his paternal grandparents in person on the coming holiday. Pending an in-person meeting between the father’s parents and their grandson, however, the father is encouraged to continue or develop remote options for Christian to connect with his grandparents. Skype is now a common method of “visiting” between children and their relatives at a distance, and much can be shared in that context. Other technological methods may be available as well. Although father’s affidavit indicated that his parents manage some chronic health issues, they are both in their early to mid-70’s. The evidence did not preclude the possibility that they may travel to meet Christian at some point in the future.
Costs:
[38] It was abundantly clear to me that both parents love and care about their son and want the best for him. On the issue to travel to Egypt, however, they reached an impasse and sought the court’s assistance. The fact that the father would propose a trip to Egypt in December 2016/January 2017 was in fact expressly contemplated in the parties’ Divorce Order. Although the ultimate decision on this motion was ultimately not in father’s favour, it was clear on the record that he took many steps, when planning the proposed trip, to mitigate the risks of travel to Egypt at the current time, and the challenges posed by his son’s current health and behaviour issues. The court is respectful, as is the mother, of father’s desire to share his home country and culture directly with his son. In all the circumstances this is not an appropriate case for an award of costs. “
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Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v. M.M., 2016 ONCJ 323
“1: INTRODUCTION
[1] In this decision the court determines whether three children are Indian or native persons for the purposes of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11 (“CFSA” or the “Act”). It also addresses the subsidiary issues of identifying a child’s band or native community. There is no other case directly on point.
[2] Such determinations turn on whether a child is an Indian or native person as defined in the CFSA. They are fact driven and are to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
[3] The determination is an important one. Those children who fit within the definitional criteria gain automatic access to the benefits, special treatment, and special considerations the Act affords to Indian and native children. Those children who do not fit within the definitional criteria face significant and disadvantaging consequences. They are denied access to such benefits and special consideration. They are to be treated no differently than any other child with cultural, ethnic or racial ties to an identifiable ethnic community.
[4] The definitions are very restrictive. Self-identification with or sharing an ancestral, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or historical connection to an indigenous group or another person of aboriginal decent is not enough. The strength of such connections or ties is not a factor capable of bringing an aboriginal child within the definitional requirements.
[5] The facts of this particular case also underscore the important role social workers, solicitors for a child protection agency, counsel for respondents, and the judiciary, have to play in these child protection cases. Social workers must conduct thorough investigations at the outset of their involvement with families who self-identify as aboriginal; counsel for the society has the responsibility to ensure that all evidence is put before the court in a fair, unbiased, and balanced way, depicting the reality of a child’s circumstances. All counsel, particularly society counsel, must bring any ambiguity, discord, or uncertainty about the Indian or native status of children to the attention of the court as soon as possible. Similarly, the court must be vigilant and proactive. It must make enquiries early on so as to identify those children who are potentially Indian or native as defined by the Act. It must also determine the Indian or native status of children, as the Act mandates, as soon as practicable.”
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Baijnauth v Baijnauth, 2016 ONSC 4998
“[5] The issues that present themselves in this case are as follows:
a) The calculation of the Respondent’s income.
b) The calculation of child support.
c) The quantum and apportionment of section 7 expenses.
d) The calculation of the equalization payment.
e) The quantum and duration of spousal support.
f) The question of what remedies should be provided to protect the amounts of child and spousal support payable, if any.
[6] Each of these issues requires me to look at a complex web of facts. “
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2016/2016onsc4998/2016onsc4998.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAGIlRvb3IiAAAAAAE&resultIndex=70
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Singh v Singh, 2016 ONSC 3351
“[1] In an endorsement dated December 24, 2015, I granted the motion brought on behalf of Mr. Singh for an order for payment out of the funds held in trust. At paragraph 24 of the endorsement, I directed Mr. Toor to make written submissions as to costs by January 11 provided that the submissions not exceed 3 pages plus costs outline plus offer to settle if any. And I directed Ms. Singh to do the same by January 25, 2016.
[2] Mr. Toor complied.
[3] Ms. Singh brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court and accordingly she did not comply. She asked for an extension of time to file her submissions as to costs. In paragraph 33 of my endorsement dated March 18, 2016, I ordered that within 5 business days of receipt of the disposition of the motion for leave to appeal, whether leave was granted or not, counsel for Ms. Singh shall serve and file written submissions as to costs of the motion.
[4] The endorsement by Sachs J. dismissing the motion for leave is dated April 6, 2016.
[5] At the TMC held on January 8, 2016, I directed the resumption of the trial on May 16, 2016. On May 16, I pointed out that counsel for Ms. Singh had failed to comply with paragraph 33.
[6] On May 18, 2016 I received from Ms. Heft written submissions as to costs of the motion heard October 27, 2015 with no explanation for failing to deliver the submissions by April 13, 2016; no request for an extension of time to deliver the submissions; and consisting of 11 pages, not 3. The affidavit of service indicates that Ms. Singh served the costs submissions on May 16, 2016 by mail which means that Mr. Toor may not have received the submissions. No doubt Mr. Toor would object both to the late delivery and to the excessive content. I do not intend to give him an opportunity to make such submissions. I will deal with the issue of costs on the basis of the submissions received.
[7] In his submissions, Mr. Toor asked for fees for 17.1 hours at $250 per hour for a total of $4275 plus HST in the amount of $555.75 for a total of $4830.75. He takes the position that his client is entitled to costs because he was successful on the motion; that extra services were required because Ms. Singh filed a responding affidavit which totaled 315 pages notwithstanding my direction that the total pages should not exceed 50; and that his client should recover full indemnity costs.”
ORDER TO GO AS FOLLOWS:
[12] Ms. Singh shall pay to Mr. Singh costs of the motion heard October 27, 2015 in the amount of $3164 plus HST which she shall pay by June 20, 2016.”
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Singh v Singh, 2016 ONSC 3347
“[1] Following the TMC on October 7, 2015, I released a detailed endorsement with respect to the trial scheduled to begin the week of October 19, 2015. At that time I estimated the duration of the trial at 10 days. The trial started on Tuesday October 20. On the morning of October 21, I granted the request of Ms. Singh’s then counsel Ken Wise & Associates, that he be permitted to withdraw as her counsel and I dismissed Ms. Singh’s motion for an order pursuant to rule 4 that articling student Zev Wise (the son of Ken Wise) be permitted to represent her at the trial. [2015 ONSC 6648] I then granted Ms. Singh’s motion for an order adjourning the trial.
[2] On October 27, 2015 I heard a motion on behalf of Mr. Singh for an order that $60,000 be released from funds held in trust pursuant to court order and in an endorsement dated December 24, 2015, I granted that motion. [2015 ONSC 8060]
[3] On January 8, 2016 I held a Trial Management Conference. As indicated in the detailed endorsement dated March 18, 2016, Ms. Heft agreed during the TMC to act for Ms. Singh in the continuation of the trial and I set the date for resumption of the trial as May 16, 2016, which was a date convenient to both counsel. At that time, the estimated duration of the trial was 13-14 days. At paragraphs 20 to 34 of that endorsement, I made detailed orders requiring counsel to take specified steps before the resumption of the trial. The endorsement was lengthy and detailed to specify what was required of counsel, and particularly Ms. Heft as she accepted to act for Ms. Singh at that point in the proceedings.
[4] On May 16, 2016, at the resumption of the trial, Mr. Toor brought a motion for an adjournment because his client was in India and had not been able to retrieve his passport so that he could travel to Canada. For oral reasons given that day, I adjourned the trial to give Mr. Singh a further opportunity to retrieve his passport from the court in India so that he could attend the trial and I directed that the trial resume on May 31, 2016 and continue June 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 27, 29 and 30 for a total of 14 days.”
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Singh v Singh, 2016 ONSC 2309
“[1] The Moving Party, Ms. Singh, seeks leave to appeal the order of Kiteley J., dated December 24, 2015, in which she ordered that $60,000 be released to the Responding Party from funds currently being held in trust. The Responding Party was requesting funds for living expenses and legal fees.
[2] As a result of an ex parte order dated November 27, 2012 funds in the name of the Responding Party were frozen. On December 13, 2012 the ex parte order was continued until January 15, 2013. After that date, the Responding Party requested the release of certain funds, but his requests were ultimately denied, without prejudice to his ability to renew his request before the trial judge. Kiteley J. made the order the Moving Party is seeking leave to appeal as the trial judge. In doing so, she found that the initial ex parte order was an order under s. 12 of the Family Law Act, not a mareva injunction. She also found that it was not necessary to continue the s. 12 preservation order to protect the interests of the Responding Party to an equalization payment. Finally she found that the reason the Moving Party was seeking to have all the funds preserved is because of a misappropriation claim she was making against the Responding Party, which is the subject of a separate civil action that is also proceeding to trial. Since the civil claim is not a claim under the Family Law Act, it could not be the subject of s. 12 preservation order under that Act.
[3] The test for granting leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) is well-settled. It is recognized that leave should not be easily granted and the test to be met is a very strict one. There are two possible branches upon which leave may be granted. Both branches involve a two-part test and, in each case, both aspects of the two-part test must be met before leave may be granted.
[6] The Moving Party alleges that leave should be granted because Kiteley J.’s order conflicts with other orders made by other judges. In support of this allegation she cites a number of cases. However, an examination of those cases reveals that the facts and issues in those cases were very different than the facts and issues giving rise to the order the Moving Party is seeking leave to appeal. In other words, there is no matter of principle raised by this appeal that the Divisional Court needs to clarify.
[7] The Moving Party also argues that there is good reason to doubt the correctness of the order she is seeking leave to appeal. I disagree. However, even if that were the case, the proposed appeal does not raise any matter or issue that goes beyond the interests of the parties. The questions raised are not questions of general or public importance relevant to the development of the law and the administration of justice.
[8] For these reasons the motion for leave to appeal is dismissed. As the successful party, the Responding Party may make submissions in writing on the question of costs within 10 days.”
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Singh v Singh, 2015 ONSC 8060
“[1] On October 13, 2015 I released a detailed Trial Management Conference endorsement arising from the TMC held on October 7, 2015. The trial started on October 21, 2015. On the morning of October 22, 2015, Ken Wise, lawyer for Ms. Singh asked to be removed as counsel. I granted that order. Ms. Singh then brought a motion pursuant to rule 4 of the Family Law Rules for an order that she be represented at the trial by Zev Wise, articling student and the son of Ken Wise. I dismissed that motion.[1]
[2] As a consequence, the trial had to be adjourned to give Ms. Singh the opportunity to retain a lawyer. That led to Mr. Toor asking for an opportunity to bring a motion for an order for payment out of the funds held in trust.
[3] Mr. Toor served a notice of motion and affidavit by email on Friday October 23, 2015. Ms. Singh served responding material on Monday October 26. I specifically directed that her record not exceed 50 pages. Instead, Ms. Singh served a motion record and affidavit with exhibits attached that totaled 315 pages. Mr. Toor pointed out that Zev Wise had contacted him prior to sending the voluminous material by fax and Mr. Toor had agreed to accept it because of the time constraints on condition that Ms. Singh would provide a paper copy of the entire affidavit and exhibits. Instead of bringing that with her to the motion, she sent it by mail to Mr. Toor and he of course did not receive it before the motion. He nonetheless agreed to proceed with his client’s motion. I pointed out to Ms. Singh that she did not comply with my order and ought to have complied with Mr. Toor’s conditional acceptance.
[4] In the notice of motion, Mr. Singh asks for the following:
(a) an order that the Applicant be paid $8000 in accordance with paragraph 11 of the order of Justice Goodman dated March 14, 2013;
(b) an order that the Respondent pay to the Applicant $771.37 which represents the outstanding costs award in the Court of Appeal file no. C57440 plus post-judgment interest as per the Courts of Justice Act rate;
(c) an order that $60,000 be released to the Applicant from funds currently held in trust for living and legal expenses.
ORDER TO GO AS FOLLOWS:
[23] From the funds held in trust to the credit of these actions, Nikolay Y. Chsherbinin or Ken Wise, as the case may be, shall pay to Mr. Chandel or to whom he in writing directs the following payments:
(a) the sum of $750.00 in full satisfaction of the obligation on Ms. Singh to comply with the order made by the Court of Appeal dated September 3, 2014, to be paid out of whatever portion the trial judge decides is payable to Ms. Singh.
(b) the sum of $60,000.
[24] By January 11, 2016 Mr. Toor shall make written submissions as to costs not exceeding 3 pages plus costs outline plus offer to settle this motion, if any.”
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Singh v Singh, 2015 ONSC 6648
“This is a trial of two actions, Action Number CV-13-477962 and FS-13-388450. The trial was originally set for November 17, 2014. On November 10, 2014, at a trial management conference, Justice Stevenson vacated that date apparently because the parties were involved in a trial in India. Justice Stevenson set the date of March 16, 2015 for ten days for the trial.
I released him as counsel of record because it was clear he was incapable of doing what needs to be done to the conclusion of what is estimated as a ten day trial. Ms. Singh then made oral submissions asking for leave pursuant to rule 4 that I make an order permitting Zev Wise to represent her. Mr. Toor is opposed.
In this case, I have made an order removing Ken Wise and, therefore, removing Ken Wise & Associates as solicitor as record. There is no articling principal behind Zev Wise in dealing with this particular trial. He remains under a cloud in dealing with his professional body. Ms. Singh is very articulate and well-educated. If she chooses, she may act for herself. If she does not, she will have to retain counsel. The complexity of this case arises from the issues raised in the civil action, not in the Family Law action. It would be unfair to Mr. Singh and his counsel and to this court to expect an articling student who is under a cloud with his professional body to be permitted to represent her.
The motion for leave pursuant to rule 4 is dismissed. “